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Moscow itself has a clear interest in expanding the US assurances into a clear US acceptance of a "socialist," Soviet-oriented and supported foothold in the Western hemisphere. For if Khrushchev has learnt from recent events that the US will not tolerate a strategic Soviet bridgehead at its doorstep, he also cannot fail to have noticed that the US -- and the OAS -- was galvanized into action only when the attempt was made to expand the ideological, political and economic bridgehead into an offensive military base.

Moscow probably feels that it has a plausible case when it seeks to extend the US assurance against invasion to include other, less drastic forms of hostile action against Castro. And it would not be out of character for it to seek to add to the plausibility of this case by offering restraint on Castro's subversive machinations in surrounding countries. (Historically, there is ample precedent in this sort of an arrangement in, for example, the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921.)

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As Bubnov emphasized, Moscow has always advocated a normalization of US-Cuban relations. [It is true that Castro, like other dictators, especially Communist ones, needs an enemy. However, a Castro accepted, however uneasily, by the US, is of greater value at this stage than a Castro ostracized, blockaded and solely dependent on Soviet support.] And to this end, Moscow and possibly Castro too, may well find it desirable to tone down Castro's external militance for the time being.

In sum, both Khrushchev and Castro have strong reasons to seek maximum US acceptance of the Cuban regime. Castro, no doubt, would like to see the US-Soviet arrangement now supposedly in force scuttled. But he is powerless to achieve this. He is seeking the next best thing. And so is Khrushchev.

Pitfalls

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US guarantees to refrain from subversive action against Cuba in exchange for Castro guarantees to cease subversive radio broadcasts, guerrilla training in Cuba, and material support for the revolutionary left in Latin America would probably have the effect of putting the issue into a US-Cuban context rather than an OAS-Cuban context, where it is now, following the missile base crisis. In addition, any Castro pledges would be almost impossible to police in such a way as to find a bases for an indictment that would stand up. On the other hand, the Communists would claim violation of a US non-aggression pledge whenever and wherever refugee activities hostile to Castro occur.

Conclusion

While we cannot exclude Soviet efforts to introduce new conditions for the Soviet missile withdrawal (especially while we lack information on the status

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of the sites), the Soviets, in probing our willingness to normalize relations with Castro, are evidently looking beyond the consummation of the present arrangement. In the end, they would probably accept any additional assurances and changes in US policy they can get. They will certainly insist on such changes if the US attempted to expand the missile agreement to include inhibitions on Castro's subversive activities.

The Soviet goal is to quiet down the present situation and to achieve maneuver for Castro. If they succeed, they will probably feel that they have mitigated some of Castro's disenchantment and kept the way open for a promising Castro role in the Western Hemisphere despite the blow which they have now suffered.

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